A series of parallel policy developments in Washington and Beijing has signaled that civil nuclear reactor exports are becoming a critical arena of global strategic competition. Following the March launch of its 15th Five-Year Plan, the Chinese government published key sectoral guidelines by the end of June, including the 15th Five-Year Plan for Building a Beautiful China and the 15th Five-Year Plan for a New-type Energy System. These blueprints outline China's clear domestic and international ambitions to establish itself as a global leader in nuclear energy governance and reactor exports.
Almost simultaneously, the United States, Japan, and South Korea announced a new Memorandum of Cooperation at the NATO Summit. This agreement aims to accelerate the deployment of small modular reactors (SMRs) in third countries, focusing initially on the Indo-Pacific region. Since the Trump administration, Washington has explicitly linked domestic and international nuclear reactor deployment to U.S. national security. The primary diplomatic tool for this effort has been the "123 Agreement" for peaceful nuclear cooperation. Recently, Southeast Asian nations have emerged as a primary focus for these agreements, directly overlapping with China's civil nuclear engagement efforts.
Energy security remains a critical vulnerability for Southeast Asian nations. This risk is underscored by potential maritime bottlenecks, such as the Strait of Hormuz, through which 60 percent of the region's crude oil passes. While some local governments have implemented short-term demand-curbing measures during disruptions, long-term solutions are urgently needed. Driven by the rapid expansion of data centers, electric vehicles, and industrial manufacturing, Southeast Asia's electricity demand is projected to grow by more than 100 TWh by 2030.
To address this surge, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam have set national targets to operate their first nuclear reactors before 2035. Meanwhile, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, and Thailand are actively evaluating nuclear power as a component of their future energy mix. Regional interest is heavily concentrated on SMR technology, which is seen as a viable alternative to traditional reactors.
Traditional nuclear projects are notorious for high upfront costs and prolonged construction timelines. In the United States and Europe, new reactor builds have been rare, with licensing hurdles and a loss of specialized construction expertise further inflating budgets and schedules. Conversely, Asian builders, primarily in China and South Korea, have maintained a track record of delivering reactors on time and within budget.
For nations entering the nuclear sector, the challenge extends beyond construction. Establishing a nuclear program requires building a comprehensive national infrastructure, including regulatory frameworks, safety cultures, and trained personnel. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), this preparatory phase takes 10 to 15 years. Because modern reactors have operational lifespans of 60 to 80 years, and decommissioning requires another 10 to 25 years, importing a reactor establishes a century-long political, legal, logistical, and educational alignment between the host nation and the exporter.
Globally, Russia, China, and the United States are the primary nuclear exporters. Russia leads in foreign reactor builds through its state-owned company, Rosatom, which offers an attractive build-own-operate model and covers the entire fuel cycle. However, international sanctions following Russia's invasion of Ukraine have disrupted Rosatom's financing and logistical capabilities, leading to project delays. China also relies on state-owned enterprises, led by the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) and China General Nuclear Power Group (CGN). Though Beijing previously aimed to construct 30 reactors in Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) countries by 2030, its export success has so far been limited to Pakistan, where Chinese firms supply the fuel but do not own or operate the plants.
In contrast, the U.S. export model is driven by the private sector, supported by government-backed capacity-building programs. These include the Foundational Infrastructure for Responsible Use of Small Modular Reactor Technology (FIRST) program, which assists partner nations with safety and nonproliferation frameworks. Financial support is channeled through the Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM) SMR Financing Toolkit and loans or guarantees from the International Development Finance Corporation (DFC). While the U.S. does not currently take back spent fuel, policy discussions are increasingly leaning toward fuel recycling to expand capacity.
Southeast Asian nations are weighing these competing options carefully. They highly value U.S. technological leadership, regulatory standards, and safety protocols. Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Singapore, and Thailand have already signed 123 Agreements with the U.S., while Malaysia has secured a Memorandum of Understanding to initiate negotiations. At the same time, China's competitive pricing and rapid construction timelines remain highly attractive to countries rushing to meet impending national energy deadlines.
Beijing began its civil nuclear engagement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 2015, focusing on workforce training. China's Linglong One became the first land-based SMR design to receive IAEA approval, positioning it as a prime option for BRI countries. However, the commercial operation timeline for the first Linglong One has faced delays, and a lack of transparent information regarding its status has raised questions among potential regional buyers.
The United States has achieved its own regulatory milestones in the region. In 2025, the U.S.-based company Thorcon International obtained a first-stage license from Indonesia's nuclear regulator, BAPETEN, for its molten salt reactor design. Additionally, the U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) funded a feasibility study for the Manila Electric Company (Meralco) in the Philippines to integrate U.S. SMRs. The U.S. Department of Commerce has also established an SMR export working group to streamline communications between private industry and Southeast Asian governments.
To overcome domestic construction bottlenecks and compete effectively with China, the U.S. is relying on its alliances with Japan and South Korea. Meanwhile, Beijing is consolidating its own approach. Following the release of its 15th Five-Year Plan, CNNC signed new cooperation agreements with China Energy Engineering Corporation (CEEC), TBEA, and the Bank of China, focusing on international market expansion. CEEC operates energy projects in 140 countries, while TBEA specializes in renewable energy and transmission solutions. Through these partnerships, CNNC aims to integrate Chinese technology into foreign energy grids before introducing nuclear development proposals.
Historically, Southeast Asian nations have maintained a delicate balance, cooperating with China on economic initiatives while collaborating with the United States on regional security. As the geopolitical race for nuclear exports intensifies alongside a global energy crisis, the region faces the complex task of maintaining this balanced diplomatic stance while securing its long-term energy future.
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